How Humanitarian Agencies Operate in Somalia

by Michael Bear

category: Humanitarian Relief

Published October 26, 2008 @ 12:26AM PT

While the last post looked at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, this one focuses on how humanitarian agencies actually operate.  Somalia is one of the most dangerous countries in the world for aid workers, with 29 killed this year alone, including two just a week ago.

Despite these challenges, aid is still getting through.  Overall, there are roughly 1,500 aid workers for Somalia - one-tenth the number in Darfur. (Of these, about half are based in Nairobi.)

In September alone, WFP, CARE and ICRC distributed food aid to almost two million people, including to the camps in Afgooye.  UNICEF and its partners also vaccinated 140,000 children last month. (For a comprehensive report of humanitarian activities in September, see here.)

Yet the brutal reality is that because of insecurity, humanitarian agencies must compromise some of their basic principles in order to continue providing assistance. In a recent article, Philippe Lazzarini, the former head of OCHA Somalia, explained that "were we to insist on adhering strictly to our own humanitarian principles, aid operations in Somalia would grind to a halt."  According to Lazzarini:

This compromise has included contacts with militias for protection, conceding to historical clan influences and, without a significant presence on the ground, doing without the usual monitoring and evaluation of assistance. ‘Do no harm’ has been amended to ‘Do less harm’.

Another article, by Reena Ghelani of OCHA Somalia and Zia Choudhury of the Danish Refugee Council, paints a similar picture:

Somalis are suffering in frightening numbers but, even with relatively significant resources at their disposal, humanitarian workers are frequently unable to confirm that the majority of aid delivered is reaching the people who really need it. Rather, in parts of south and central Somalia, humanitarian managers admit that they sometimes have no idea how much assistance reaches its intended beneficiaries, and even less idea what impact it has.

For more detailed information, see below:

Key points from Lazzarini's article:

- "UN member states seem to be subsidising humanitarian operations as a way of filling the political and moral void. This comes with a hefty price tag: in 2007, humanitarian and development aid for an estimated population of less than 10 million topped $500 million. Another $1 billion in remittances is thought to flow into the country from the Somali diaspora."

- "Although numerous humanitarian activities are ongoing, this is thanks mainly to the courage, commitment and dedication of the Somalis who deliver the vast majority of assistance, since the situation on the ground is deemed too dangerous for international aid workers."

- "According to the principles of humanitarian action, intervention should be independent (selecting beneficiaries without interference), neutral (not taking any political side) and impartial (based on the principle of non-discrimination). ‘Do no harm’ should be the modus operandi. For the humanitarian community working in Somalia, 16 years of functioning in an environment of ‘warlordism’ has made it very hard to stick to these humanitarian principles. A pragmatic choice has had to be made: abide by the principles and cease to function, or compromise them and see that at least some life-saving humanitarian assistance gets to those who need it."

- "[UN] Security rules and regulations, while intended to promote an ‘enabling environment’ for humanitarian assistance and protection, have tended to cut off aid workers from the assisted and host population. The emphasis on physical safety, while justified by the increased targeting of humanitarian workers, widens misperception, mistrust and distance between aid workers and the populations they serve. Mini ‘green zones’, in the form of heavily bunkered UN compounds, armed escorts, armoured vehicles and even bullet-proof flack jackets and helmets, all increasingly isolate humanitarian workers from their operating environment."

Key points from Ghelani and Choudhury's article:

- "The usual principles which define our work – independence, neutrality and impartiality – cannot easily be upheld consistently, and the frameworks for improving the quality of our services, such as beneficiary participation and monitoring systems, are often bypassed."

- "The dangers and challenges of operating in Somalia have at times left humanitarians with little choice but to abandon the drive to meet humanitarian standards and continuously improve their work. How can you deliver a high standard of work if you face such inaccessibility and insecurity? Non-Somali staff often claim that it is just too difficult to operate. Those familiar with working in Somalia will recognise the classic justification for the inability to explain quality or progress: a shoulder shrug, accompanied by ‘oh, but this is Somalia’. The despondency which many aid workers feel is strengthened by regular evacuations or closures of programmes."

- "A more worrying sentiment has also developed (which again is not uncommon in difficult contexts), whereby the responsibility for poor-quality aid work is transferred to Somalis. This sentiment has a dangerous edge to it, as increasingly aid workers seem to blame an inability to deploy expatriate staff for a large portion of their problems."

For more information, see the recent edition of Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, which includes a number of articles focused on Somalia, including the two mentioned above.

[Photo of Somalia from MSF-USA / Marcus Bleasdale]