The problem is that most security incidents involve national staff, so they often don't register at headquarters level. This is not to say that security officers aren't concerned - they are - but that the institutions themselves are not concerned.

This is one area where the UN has really moved ahead of the NGO community, following the debacle of the Canal Hotel bombing. I have been pleased that my security training has been checked at every UN office that I have deployed to in the last couple of years - a major improvement on past experience.

I was shocked to hear that David Veness, who built UN DSS into a serious concern, resigned over the Algeria bombings. However it clearly showed that he took the position seriously - how often do you hear of senior UN officials resigning over problems that happen under their management?

So now, it's time for NGOs to catch up. What needs to be done is obvious - it just needs better management to implement it.

Normal 0 It's very ironic that staff in the worst places on the planet get so little security training, while everyone I know working in comparatively safe and peaceful Bosnia and Kosovo had to go through extensive and at times a bit alarmist-feeling security training before they even got a desk. When I was in Bosnia in 2007-2008, I had to go through several full days of training on security. Of course, in Bosnia, most of the dangers are environmental; unmarked mine fields (of which there are a greatly diminished number, happy to say), unsafe buildings, and various kinds of dangerous weather and very bad roads (which have killed more aid workers there over the past 17 years than anything else.) Of the few human dangers, most of them are pretty mild. Apartment burglaries are extremely common, almost to the point of inevitable, but almost always happen when occupants are away. Once in a while, if you're particularly unlucky, you might get a pissed off farmer who doesn't like what it says on your vehicle and decides to bump you on a narrow mountain road a couple of hundred feet up. And a colleague and his friend were briefly and bizarrely kidnapped in Serbia while en route to Pristina for a personal trip.

Lucky for my colleagues and me, our security training covered all of the above and more. The mine awareness training was so heavy-handed that another intern refused to set foot on unpaved ground for probably a full two months after. It was, as could be expected, the more mundane stuff that can in most useful for my fellow inductees; how to avoid being pick-pocketed, how to avoid patronizing restaurants and bars that are suspected of involvement in human trafficking, to always notify the office if we were going to venture far afield so they’d know where to look if we didn’t show up on Monday, etc.

To make a long story short, I cannot BELIEVE aid workers in places like Afghanistan and Sudan don't receive necessary security training. If I end up in the latter a few months from now, I'll insist on some kind of security training, absolutely.

In our organisation, a few years back everyone had to follow a 2-3 days hands-on security awareness training. The training was excellent and had to be renewed after 3 or 4 years.

If you did not follow the training, you were not eligible for promotion, you got minus points on your end-year evaluation etc..

Unfortunately, nowadays this is replaced with an eLearning tool. Still compulsory.
And this is UN-wide.

People do not receive security clearance if they have not followed the training.

For specific high risk operations, like Iraq in 2003-2004, people had to follow a tailor made training before they got security clearance.

Peter

Oh, and to answer the question specifically: personally, I had two security trainings. Plus did two eLearning courses (compulsory).

When I was running the fast intervention team, I had all my staff do the security training every two years.

On top of that, every year we had specific courses on first aid, defensive driving, HIV/AIDS, fire training,...

This has always been one of my pet peeves. Its always shocked me when I arrive in a new conflict zone, ask how many staff have had security training, and find that 50% or more have either had no training or it was more than 5 years ago.

From a security officer's point of view this is a difficult situation to correct. A security officer in a place like Afghanistan, Somalia or Sri Lanka is going to be so busy putting out figurative fires that they are not going to have a lot of spare time to run three day training courses. Program people won't have free time either and given the choice between implementation and training most will choose the former.

So what can we as individuals do about it? Here are my ideas. If anyone has others please share.

1. During your next job interview ask the interview team about the security training (if any) provided by the organization. If you are worried that this will make you look timid throw in this line: "As a manger I want to ensure that I'm taking adequate measures to help improve the safety and security of my staff".

2. Make time to attend personal security training before the crisis. Don't wait until the security situation in the country where you work is careening out of control before you think about your security.

3. As a manager make sure that ALL your staff get training as well. Don't just email everyone the training application form. It should be a case of "Congratulations you've been selected for a three day security course!"

4. On every report you write that has a 'personnel issues' section note any security training shortcomings.

5. Take control of your own security - Not enough Motorola radios?... buy your own. No first aid kits?... carry your own! No proper locks?... travel with a rubber wedge to jamb under doors. The vehicle radio doesn't work?... don't travel in it.

6. Don't overlook synergistic courses. Even though first aid courses, driver training, and fire safety training don't have security in their titles they all improve staff safety and security. Most countries have a Red Cross/Red Crescent chapter that will provide first aid training at little or no cost in the local language especially if you provide the facilities and a lunch. Everyone working in a crisis country should have some first aid training.

Anyone have any other ideas?

Michael, I believe you raise a good point here. Sending your post through the EISF network could be of some help as several recipients are decision makers within their organisation... Also, I hope EISF will soon be able to facilitate joint trainings (we would not provide the trainings, but provide comprehensive information about trainings).

jsr

Further to Kevin's comment, I would highly recommend ensuring that there is a security component (responsibility and accountability) in any job description for senior management and project managers and then ensure that they are scored on this aspect in annual assessments. I can't count how many security assessments I've conducted in the places that really need it, only to realize that the country director or organization considers the assessment a "check in the box" and would never inplement any of the recommendations.

It always comes down to four big issues:

1) The money issue when it comes to providing training to field staff.  When non-profits deploy into the field they worry more about getting the bulk of their funding into the work than providing the proper security training needed.  I know of several cases where on the ground situations forced the evacuation of field staff.  The money used for evacuation was taken from the project budget, forcing the project to shut down.  Organizations need to make security, security training, crisis management planning and training, evacuation and continuity of operations line items in their budget proposals.  The initial costs may seem large, but how can you measure those costs compared to the life of an aid worker, or for that matter the need to shut down an entire project.  More often than not, when competitive bids are being sought, the first thing NGOs do is cut the security component/budget from the bid.

2) There is an unfortunate culture/mindset that exists within much of the NGO community (not shared by all of course) that having a strong security component will separate the staff on the ground from being able to do their jobs, acting as a barrier to the affected populations.  Unfortunately the new reality of the post-Cold War, post-911 world is that aid workers are easy prey for terrorists, insurgents, criminals, you name it.  NGO staff need to overcome the idea that everybody loves them because they are helping people and the work they are doing is for the good of all.  This is especially true in places like Afghanistan where many of the projects NGOs work on go against the cultural norms present in the country, case in point being projects for educating girls.

3) The world of security professionals is dominated by ex-military and law enforcement who have very little or no experience working with NGOs.  Added to the fact that NGO salaries pale in comparison to what they could earn working in the private sector.  The flipside to that is that NGOs seem to have a strong dislike for ex-military and law enforcement, viewing them as trigger happy.  The fact is that the training for both come from different angles.  The ex-military/law enforcement look at things in either an offensive or completely defensive posture; the NGOs want to reach out and really mingle with their aid recipients.  Neither groups speaks the same language.

4) New government (mostly US) policies of having the military involved in "hearts and minds" campaigns where one day they are building bridges and digging wells, and the next day involved in military activities blurs the line between aid/development workers and military involvement in aid projects.  The affected populations often can no longer distinguish between aid workers and military, making any foreigner a potential target.  Now I am not saying that the military should not play a role in aid or development work.  Only the military has the logistical capabilities and budgets to get needed supplies where they need to be in record time.  Here we can look at the example of the December 26, 2004 Tsunami as an example.  If the President of the United States says I want to see food on that beach in Aceh in 24 hrs or else, the food gets there.

Having come from a private security company and now doing consulting for an NGO I have had the opportunity to work with both.  The fact is that the mindset from both camps has to change.  But particularly on the NGO side.  They need to make security a priority within their organizations, because a minimal or complete lack of security can leave not only affect their staff but those they are trying to help stranded.

Donors, in particular government donors should insist on having security training as part of the proposals, and if need be, pay for it themselves.  Aid/development workers give up the luxuries we take for granted to do the bidding (no pun intend) of government and private donors in some of the most hostile environments on the planet, for little pay and even less recognition. 

Now because of the current state of the world more aid organizations are placing an increased emphasis on the need for proactive versus reactive security.  But there is much to be done.  There are companies/organizations that cater to the specific needs of NGO security, but it remains the responsibility of NGO management to enact and enforce security policies and be willing to spend the money needed to adequately prepare their employees for field operations.

A more concerted effort on the part of NGO security officers to communicate with not only themselves but with other organizations (even companies) operating in high risk areas to share intelligence and help each other.  I know there is a lot of communication between NGO security officers, but there seems to be a reluctance to approach security officers who don’t work in the NGO domain.  These companies usually have more resources and capital and be helpful when things get rough.  They can call it Corporate Social Responsibility if they want, write a press release if they want, who cares.  In the end, keeping field staff safe so they can do the job of helping those who can't help themselves is the most important.

While I was working at UN Volunteers headquarters in oh-so-safe Germany, a mandate came from UNDP that every employee had to take an online training course in field security matters. It was interactive and at least somewhat helpful, but I suspect a lot of UNV employees do what they often do for such online trainings and have their interns and assitants take it for them. In Kabul, it was mandatory to take a security training/briefing shortly after arriving, but I was surprised that there wasn't an onsite version at both the Afghan government office where I worked and at the UN guest house where I lived -- I had to ask around to know where the bomb shelter was, and that took a lot of asking. The excuse as to why not was, "We don't have time," but it seemed to me it was mostly about denial and lack of making it a priority. My husband and I have been toying with the idea of paying for our own security training, since we travel abroad so much to developing countries.